While the asymmetric treatment of positive and negative income creates clear tax incentives to shift income among a group of closely related corporations, attempts to document the impact of such behavior on economic outcomes are relatively sparse. We aim to provide evidence on taxmotivated transfers from a large dataset of Japanese corporate groups. Using company level data on 33,340 subsidiary time pairs from 1988, 1990, and 1992, we consider testable implications of income shifting in a theoretical model tailored to the Japanese institution of the early 1990s and empirically examine the spread of the profitability distribution, the attrition rate of loss-making subsidiaries, and the propensity to report zero profit. The findings suggest that income shifting was pervasive when Japan had not adopted a formal allowance for group-level tax. The result underscores the importance of accounting for the inter-relatedness of companies, in designing a corporate income tax.
Introduction
It is common for a firm to organize its businesses as legally distinct corporations. A holding company structure, where several corporations are owned and headed by a single company, is a ubiquitous form of business organization. Group operations can be efficient for several reasons. To avoid negative synergy, it may be necessary to separate conflicting business activities (John and Ofek 1995) . To control the risk of new ventures, investors may utilize the limited liability status of corporations. In the majority of nations, however, a corporate group may be required to pay more in corporate income taxes (CIT) by not operating as a conglomerate. According to a summary of corporate taxes around the world (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2002), 35 out of 121 countries make explicit allowance for group taxation in various forms, and, more recently, 5 of those 121 countries have newly allowed for group taxation or broadened the existing system. However, others do not in principle allow for the consolidation of group income. The loss-offset provisions moderate the tax disadvantages that arise from doing business as a group rather than as a conglomerate, but they are known to be imperfect (Altshuler and Auerbach 1990) . As a result, for a corporate group in which member corporations are filing separate tax returns, the group faces strong tax motives to engineer transactions to shift income from profitable to unprofitable affiliates.
1 According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002) , the consolidation of group income was available in Australia, Austria, Denmark, the Faro e Islands, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Taiwan, and the USA. Botswana, Israel and Malaysia allowed for a tax consolidation in specific businesses. Provisions for within-group loss transfers were available in Barbados, the Channel Islands (Guernsey), Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Latvia, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, and the UK. Finally, Mauritius allowed for loss transfers for specific businesses. Based on the comparison with the latest information published by PricewaterhouseCoopers on its website, Italy has since switched to consolidated filing, Malaysia and Singapore have adopted loss transfer that is general in scope, and Pakistan has adopted both. Korea is adopting consolidated filing in 2010 (http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/ 9B2B76032544964C8525717E00606CBD,accessedMay18,2009).
2 See the simulation by Majd and Myers (1987) for the impact of tax asymmetry on the after-tax net present value of a stand-alone project and of a profitable firm.
3 Giudici and Paleari (1998) discuss the incentives to conduct tax planning in the Italian context, where corporate groups are common but loss-offset among group members was not adopted until 1996.
of corporate groups raises questions about how best to tax a group of affiliated corporations.
To highlight the perverse incentives under a tax system lacking group provisions, this paper aims to provide evidence from a large-scale dataset on the behavioral response to the tax disadvantage. The focus is on the incentive to shift income among domestic affiliates-a type of behavior that is understudied in economics as compared to income shifting by multinational corporations, where the differences in tax rates across countries create opportunities for tax avoidance (Grubert and Mutti 1991; Hines and Rice 1994; Grubert and Slemrod 1998) . Our study focuses on the incentives created by the differences in marginal tax rates between profitable and unprofitable corporations, and adds to a small number of previous studies on within-jurisdiction income shifting in economics (Gramlich et al. 2004; Jung et al. 2007; Giudici and Paleari 1998) . In our view, it is important to distinguish between these two types of income shifting: unlike tax shelters involving offshore tax havens, which is a problem in itself, income shifting among domestic affiliates can be viewed as a symptom of problems with the tax system, provided that the shifting takes place in a close-knit group for which organizing businesses in multiple entities is efficient.
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In this view, the policy implication is that, rather than to strengthen enforcement, the tax law should be amended to account for reasonable business practices.
Our study is close to but distinct from that of Gramlich et al. (2004) , which examines income shifting among members of bank-centered corporate groups, or horizontal keiretsu, in Japan. Our study is also on Japan but focuses on a different type of grouping, sometimes referred to as a capital keiretsu, which is a group of businesses consisting of a parent company and its subsidiaries.
5
The latter type of grouping is tightly integrated: the parent company of a capital keiretsu has been required to report a consolidated financial statement since 1978; a horizontal keiretsu is not required to file such a report.
on domestic income shifting.
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To our knowledge, however, this paper is the first to examine in a large-scale way the implications of income shifting on economic outcomes.
The setting of this study is the Japanese CIT prior to the introduction of consolidated tax filing in April 2002. One advantage of the Japanese setting is the data on corporate groups, Affiliated Company Data (ACD), which contain a large number of individual observations on parents and their domestic subsidiaries-a relatively rare type of data.
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We use company-level data on subsidiaries based on a survey that covers over 1,700 corporate groups headed by large corporations. The sample consists of 33,340 subsidiary-time pairs from 1988, 1990, and 1992 . The diversity of CIT around the world preclude the direct extrapolation of the results from this study to other countries, but the Japanese CIT contains a number of generic features that make our paper relevant to the policy debate in countries that do not adopt group taxation.
The empirical analyses in this paper explore three implications of a model of income shifting tailored to the Japanese institution. Typically, studies of income shifting by multinational corporations use variations in tax rates across jurisdictions. Such an identification strategy is not readily applicable here. The first source of variation we consider is the level of ownership. To the extent that the shifting of income mainly takes place between subsidiaries with common ownership, we would expect to observe different behavior between tightly held subsidiaries and more independent companies. With this source of variation, we examine two testable implications of a model. First, the observed distribution of profit would be "narrower" than the true distribution in the presence of income shifting. Second, the attrition rate of lossmaking subsidiaries would be lower than the attrition rate that would have prevailed under no income shifting. In addition, our model suggests that, given the differential treatment of small and large firms under the Japanese CIT, the income-shifting hypothesis implies a higher propensity for large corporations to report zero profit.
The results show a pattern consistent with pervasive income shifting. We compare the profitability distribution of wholly owned and partially owned subsidiaries, controlling for the differences in observable characteristics using the semiparametric density decomposition technique developed by DiNardo et al. (1996) . In this comparison, we find that the sample of wholly owned subsidiaries has a concentrated distribution with lower variance. The first approximation of the revenue loss suggests that about 2% of income is shifted out from wholly owned subsidiaries. We estimate an interval-censored proportional hazard model on a sample of loss-making subsidiaries, controlling for observable characteristics and unobserved group heterogeneity, and find tightly owned loss-making subsidiaries are 6.5 percentage points more likely to survive over 4 years than those owned at less than the 50% level. We also find that large subsidiaries have a higher propensity to report zero profit, controlling for company characteristics. In sum, the results are largely consistent with the hypothesis that income shifting was pervasive among large Japanese capital keiretsu under a tax institution without consolidated tax filing.
The evidence on profitability distributions and attrition rates, however, can be interpreted as being consistent with the risk-sharing hypothesis, which is the dominant theory about the business function of horizontal keiretsu (Nakatani 1984) .
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As in this paper, the studies on the risk-sharing hypothesis compare the variance of profitability between group members and nonmembers, but interpret the low variance of group-affiliated companies as due to rescue operations where profitable companies provide financial assistance to loss-making affiliates. It is difficult to distinguish between these hypotheses since they are not necessarily mutually exclusive: Like charitable contributions on individual income tax returns, the tax consideration reduces the "price" of a dollar of financial assistance to (1 −t) dollars. If the price elasticity of financial assistance is not zero, then tax motive and the risk-sharing motive both affect the amount of income shifted. While strictly distinguishing between these hypotheses is beyond the scope of the current analysis, the evidence indicating a high propensity of zero-profit reporting is explained better by the tax motive. Our results suggest that the tax motive, which has been given insufficient attention in previous discussions on business groups, is a possible motive determining the degree of intragroup transfers.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the tax incentives generated by the Japanese CIT of 1988-1992, develops a model of a corporate group, and considers testable implications. Section 3 describes the data. Sections 4, 5, and 6 present the analyses of, respectively, profitability distribution, attrition rate, and the pattern of zero-profit reporting. Section 7 draws conclusions.
2 Institutional background 2.1 Tax incentives under the Japanese CIT Two generic features of tax institutions give rise to the tax disadvantage in forming corporate groups: the separate tax filing of group members and the asymmetric treatment of positive and negative income. Corporations are generally taxed on their positive income, but they receive only partial credit for negative income because corporations with negative income do not receive tax credits immediately. If group members are taxed separately, they cannot offset profits made by some members with losses incurred by others. Thus, in a given year, the tax base under separate filing is no smaller than that under consolidated filing where the group is taxed on the combined income.
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Under the Japanese CIT of 1988, the effective tax rate on retained earnings was 54.7%, so that a dollar of income shifted from profitable corporations to unprofitable corporations could reduce that years' tax liability by 54.7 cents.
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Therefore, the tax disadvantage can be a significant disincentive to the formation of corporate groups.
Various complementary institutional arrangements can partially alleviate the tax disadvantage, such as the deductibility of losses across years (Altshuler and Auerbach 1990) . Under the Japanese CIT, qualified corporations may carry back losses for one year and receive a commensurate tax refund for that year. They may choose to carry forward losses up to five years, and receive tax credits in future years.
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Loss carry can be disadvantageous, however, because credits are carried with zero nominal interest and may expire unused (Altshuler and Auerbach 1990) . Thus, these provisions reduce the incentives for income shifting without eliminating them entirely.
Another institutional arrangement is the deductibility of intragroup contributions. Japan has no formal allowance such as adopted in the Scandinavian nations, 14 but the deductibility of donations, which include intragroup 11 For simplicity, the statement assumes that the law determining the tax base is common regardless of corporate size.
12 The tax rate applies for nondividend income of the corporation with paid-in capital exceeding 100 million yen. Unlike the CIT in the USA, the tax rate is flat for this category of income. Taxes include the CIT, the corporate inhabitant tax, and the corporate enterprise tax. See Ishi (2001) for an overview of the Japanese tax system.
13 To qualify for these benefits, corporations must file their tax return in a specific format known as the blue form. Nearly all corporations have done so in recent years. This was temporarily disallowed between April 1992 and March 2000 (Ishi 2001: 168) .
14 Norway treats the contribution to companies in which parents hold more than 90% of the direct or indirect common ownership as a deductible expense (PricewaterhouseCoop-transfers, is limited.
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This form of shifting transaction is legal and can be arranged with minor transaction costs.
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In the USA, the arm's-length principle applies to transactions between related parties, whether the parties reside in the USA or abroad, based on the Article 482 of the Internal Revenue Act. Japan introduced transfer-price taxation in 1986, but its scope was limited to international transactions (Kaneko 2003: 408) . The transfer-price law thus does not apply directly to transactions between Japanese affiliates residing within Japan. The case laws have, however, established that domestic transaction prices that diverge from the arm's length price are to be treated for tax purposes as intragroup contributions (Mizuno 2005: 363) . Contributions beyond a statutory limit are not tax deductible, so to shift income beyond the amount of tax-deductible contributions, a firm would need to arrange intragroup transactions that are analogous to the income-shifting strategies in the international setting, carefully setting transfer pricing and arranging intragroup loans (Grubert 2003) . The strategy may also involve changing the timing of a transaction.
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These means would be costly given the accounting costs and the risk of being discovered in audit. 
To merge or not to merge
A group may save on taxes when losses arising from a merged member can offset the profit made by the merging member. Since the group does not incur further income-shifting costs, for the purpose of tax planning, it may seem attractive to merge a loss-making subsidiary rather than to retain a separate organizational form. Were tax-motivated mergers widely practiced, income shifting would be an irrelevant consideration. This begs a question: For the purpose of avoiding the tax disadvantage, why do firms not do business as a conglomerate rather than as separate entities? ers 2002). Some countries allow profitable companies to take over losses of another group company. In New Zealand, a profitable company can make subvention payment to an unprofitable company and deduct the expense. 15 The limit varies by company and is computed as the simple average of 2.5% of income and 0.25% of paid-in capital.
16 The deduction for intragroup contributions is aggregated with other contributions and, thus, can crowd out charitable donations.
17 In a recent high-profile case involving subsidiaries of Marubeni, a major general trading company, a gasoline wholesaler was found to be shifting the timing of rebates totaling around 300 million yen paid to five gas station operators to utilize their losses (Yomiuri Shinbun [Daily Yomiuri ], July 2, 2005, p. 19).
18 Strictly speaking, the tax law in general permits these types of transactions as long as the amount of income shifted is treated as a contribution.
The literature on business groups (e.g., Khanna and Yafeh 2007) offers some insight into the reasons for forming a group. One reason is the family consideration. Our data, for instance, included a group where the founder's two sons head two different group companies; perhaps the arrangement facilitates the management of family relations as well as the businesses. Another reason is business synergy. Our sample contains a wedding services company owned by a gas utility company; they may see a clear disadvantage in offering liquid petroleum along with wedding banquets within one corporate umbrella. When maintaining separate entities has valid business purposes, the tax advantage of a conglomerate may not justify a merger since a firm would weigh the tax advantage with transaction costs (Scholes et al. 2002) .
Tax-motivated mergers may also have institutional hindrances. Under banking and insurance business law in Japan, financial and insurance parents are prevented from directly undertaking periphery activities, including leasing, credit cards, and credit guarantees, but are allowed to establish subsidiaries to conduct such activities. Additionally, the tax consequences of a merger are not necessarily favorable. First, a company's tax base may be increased by a merger; for small businesses to receive higher limits on deductions for some expenses, they must generally be taxed separately. Second, some of the wellknown tax-avoidance strategies utilize the group structure.
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Third, out of concern about abusive tax planning, merging companies are not permitted to take over losses carried forward by merged companies (Kaneko 2003) .
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Since any unused credits accumulated by merged companies are lost in the process, the rule reduces the incentive to merge.
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In sum, the relevance of income shifting as a strategy to avoid tax disadvantage is somewhat diminished by the possibility of merger, but the strategy remains relevant.
Statutory tax schedule
This subsection describes the statutory tax schedule facing Japanese corporations to be represented in the theoretical model below. We focus on the 19 One strategy involves adjustment of the form of executive compensation. Since bonuses to executives are not tax deductible, but severance payments are deductible, firms have incentives to reward executives in the form of severance pay. By making senior executives "hop around" affiliated companies, earning severance payments each time, the group tax liability is lowered.
20 Certain exceptions were made under the tax reform of 2001-well after our sample period-to facilitate business restructuring much needed during the prolonged recession.
21 Since the merging company retains losses carried forward, the merger may be an option if it is feasible to conduct an upside-down merger, where a loss-making company acquires a profitable company.
tax schedule in the period 1988-1992 because our sample is from that period. Table 1 presents the statutory tax rates on corporations with less than 100 million yen of paid-in capital for one national tax (t r for retained earnings and t d for distributed earnings), two local taxes (t l and t e ), and their combination (t). Corporations above the size threshold face a flat rate equaling the top marginal rate. Details of the computation are presented in the note to Table  1 . Three kink points arise from reduced rates applicable under the (local) enterprise tax for income below 3.5 and 7 million yen and the national tax for income below 8 million yen. A first dollar earned in 1988 was taxed at 50 and 34 cents for large and small corporations, respectively. 500 Notes: t r is the tax rate on retained earnings; t d is on dividends; t e is the tax rate for the enterprise tax (local tax); t l is the tax rate for the inhabitant tax (local tax). t is the statutory marginal tax rate faced by small corporations, computed according to the formula used by the Ministry of Finance,
The enterprise tax is a deductible expense in the (national) corporate income tax. The tax base for the inhabitant tax is the tax liability of the national tax. Following Ishi (2001: 197) , the computation assumes that 30% of earnings are distributed (i.e.,
In 1990, the statutory rates on the (national) CIT on retained earning were reduced and those on distributed earnings were increased, eliminating the tax reduction for income paid out as dividends. In net, these two changes nearly offset each other in the marginal tax schedule, resulting in a rate structure nearly identical to the pre-1990 system under our benchmark assumption on the fraction of earnings distributed. Our benchmark follows Ishi (2001) in assuming a 70-30 split between retained and distributed earnings in computing the statutory tax rate for corporations under the split system (i.e., the pre-1990 system that applied a lower rate on distributed earnings).
This assumption is irrelevant after the 1990 reform, but under the 1988 schedule, the marginal tax schedule would be steeper if the fraction of retained earnings were higher. Under the 70-30 assumption, the difference between the marginal tax rate on the first dollar earned by a small corporation and a large corporation in 1988 and 1990-1992 is 0.167 and 0.134, respectively. If none of the income is distributed in 1988, the differential in the marginal tax rate would be 0.225 instead of 0.167. The 70-30 assumption is reasonable, however, since the tax rate on distributions is much lower than that on retained earning in 1988. The tax system also provides for the double taxation of corporate income.
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Thus, although larger tax savings arise under the 1988 system from shifting income, the tax schedules in these years create reasonably comparable tax incentives with regard to income shifting.
A theoretical analysis of the tax incentives 2.4.1 A model of income shifting under the Japanese CIT
This section outlines the tax incentives generated by the Japanese CIT with a model of a corporate group. The model aims to draw testable implications of the income-shifting hypothesis in the context of the Japanese institution. For tractability, we focus on a static setting, to abstract away from loss-carry provisions. We assume the group's choice of organizational form is exogenous, and we consider only a two-member group.
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Let us define a firm consisting of two corporations, Company 1 and Company 2. The model in essence abstracts from the control relationship of the two corporations; it is intended to capture both vertical shifting between a parent and a subsidiary or horizontal shifting between two subsidiaries. Their underlying incomes (y 1 , y 2 ) are determined exogenously, where Company 1 is profitable and Company 2 is running at a loss (y 1 > 0 > y 2 ). Their incomes are taxed separately; hence, unless the firm shifts income, it faces a tax disadvantage. Further, let us focus on the case where the amount of shifting is not capped by the profit of Company 1. Consider the following condition on overall income:
(
22 The personal income tax in Japan gives tax credits on dividend income. The dividend income under the CIT is excluded in full if the dividend is paid by a company with 25% ownership. For those with less than 25% ownership, 80% of income is excluded. The 2002 reform reduced the scope of exclusion to 50%.
23 The focus on two-member groups is not overly unrealistic since, for the population of corporations surveyed under the 2001 Establishment and Enterprise Census in Japan, the average number of members is 3.5. Our data, however, contain large corporate groups with the number of members reaching up to 342 for Mitsui & Co. Ltd.; we discuss this consideration at the end of the section.
where m is the tax threshold to be defined below and τ H is a flat tax on the profit of Company 1. Suppose s ≥ 0 is the amount of income shifted from Company 1 to Company 2, g(s) is the cost of shifting income, T (.) is the tax liability and k i is the level of paid-in capital in million yen for Company i. Company 1 is assumed to incur the transaction costs, which are tax deductible. The after-tax profits of Company 1 and 2 are
Define y = 1 2 (y 1 + |y 2 |), and ψ > 0 as the degree of integration of the management of Company 1 and Company 2. We assume that g(s) is a quadratic function of the amount shifted, based on the standard formulation in the literature (Hines and Rice 1994):
In our application, the shifting costs are high if the amount shifted, s, is large relative to the average size, y. The shifting costs also depends on the degree to which the management of two companies are integrated, ψ. The tax liability, T (.), is a function of before-tax profit (π b i ) and the level of paid-in capital (k i , in million yen). In practice, the Japanese CIT incorporates two different tax schedules, and their applicability depends on the level of paid-in capital.
Like a payoff function of a call option (Majd and Myers 1987) , large corporations pay proportional tax on their positive income (5). In contrast, small corporations pay at the reduced rate τ L on their first m yen of income (a few million) and at τ H on the amount exceeding m yen (6). The tax schedule in the model is a simplified representation of Table 1 . The subsequent discussion assumes τ H = 0.5, τ L = 0.4 and m = 8,000,000. In this analysis, Company 1 is assumed to be a large corporation. Company 2 may be small or large. Here, we will focus on the case where Company 2 is small, since the case of a large Company 2 is a special case where τ H = τ L . Under the income-shifting hypothesis, the group chooses the amount of shifting to maximize the after-tax group profit (π 1 + π 2 ). The optimization problem is equivalent to the following.
Simply, the firm chooses the amount of shifting by weighing tax savings versus shifting costs. The objective function is not globally differentiable, but it is differentiable in subdomains of s. The problem can be solved by dividing the domain of s into subdomains for which no kinks exist on the associated objective function, and then finding the global maximum among the solutions obtained in the subdomains. The Appendix details the derivation of the solution to (7), indicated by an asterisk: Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the optimal level of shifting and the parameters affecting the ease of shifting. The solution function for small subsidiaries has two steps as shown by the solid line. The solution function for large subsidiaries is flat at |y 2 |, as shown by the dashed line. In general, the optimal shifting is weakly decreasing in shifting costs (1/ψ) and in relative size (|y 2 |/y). In addition, the solution is a weakly increasing function of the tax rate faced by Company 1 and the graduation of the tax system (τ H − τ L ).
Implications of the model
Figure 1: Illustration of the optimal shifting schedules .
The income-shifting model has several implications. First, the observed distribution of profit would be more concentrated than the true distribution due to the relocation of income. This directly follows from var[
Second, the attrition rate of loss-making subsidiaries would be lower than the attrition rate that would have prevailed under no income shifting. Intuitively, the tax saving at the group level provides a reason for not closing an unprofitable operation. The closure decision at the margin would be affected by the tax consideration.
Third, the pattern of reported profit would be size dependent.
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For large corporations with paid-in capital above 100 million yen, the corporate tax is proportional to profit, with at best only a partial offset for losses. For groups containing some large corporations with losses but making overall profits, firms have an incentive to shift profits into large corporations with losses to the extent possible, thereby raising profits to zero. Any further shifting creates no tax saving yet involves real costs. On the other hand, for small corporations with paid-in capital of 100 million yen or less, the tax rate is reduced on the first 8 million yen of profit, and the remaining profit is taxed at the same rate as that of large corporations. Because of this graduated tax schedule, firms have an incentive to shift more than the amount of the losses that small corporations make, so as to exploit the rate reduction. Thus, the income-shifting hypothesis implies a higher propensity for large corporations to report zero profit when other factors are held constant. Notice that the risk-sharing hypothesis does not yield this prediction.
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24 One nice alternative approach is by Collins et al. (1997) . They focus on wholesale firms and predict that for firms that engage in income shifting, profits will respond weakly to exogenous increases in sales as those firms will counter sales jumps with manipulated transfer prices on inventory purchases. Unlike their study that utilizes annual data to examine the ratio of changes in gross profit to changes in sales, our dataset is biannual. Because the mix of sale items may not be reasonably thought of as constant for data with larger gaps, the ratio changes in a biannual data are likely to reflect compositional changes rather than the behavioral response. Beyond the aggregated sales amount, we do not observe sales from different lines of businesses. Thus, the test in Collins et al. (1997) is difficult to interpret in the current setting.
25 In a model with more than two members, the parceling out of profit to multiple subsidiaries is a possibility. Such a strategy is likely to reduce the overall incidence of zero-profit reporting, but the optimal shifting schedule for large corporations is still capped at zero profit while that for small corporations is not. A multiple member model would, however, predict more zero-profit reporting by small corporations; shifting more than |y 2 | into a small subsidiary may not save as much tax if other loss-making subsidiaries exist that can shelter the remaining income for greater tax saving. However, the parceling strategy can be too costly to implement depending on the cost function for shifting income.
Data
As a source of information on groups of corporations affiliated through capital ownership, we use the ACD, which is based on an annual survey conducted by Tokyo Keizai, a private publishing firm. Surveyed parent companies are large, most of them listed on the stock exchanges in Japan. The survey requests parent companies' financial information and company characteristics as well as the same information for affiliated companies operating in Japan. Affiliated companies include those companies defined for the financial disclosure purpose as consolidated subsidiaries and affiliates, and also includes other child companies that parents deemed related; for brevity, we call the affiliated companies reported in the survey subsidiaries, in this paper.
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The sample average of the share of voting stock owned directly or indirectly by parents is 71.5%. The subsidiaries are on average much smaller than the parents-78.3% are eligible for the reduced tax rate for small corporations described above.
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The original data contain both parents and subsidiaries. The dataset used in the analysis is constructed from three surveys conducted in 1989, 1991, and 1993 . The financial variables are based on the nearest fiscal year, so the information is based on FY1988, 1990 FY1988, , and 1992 . The information includes group affiliation, after-tax profit, paid-in capital, number of workers, sales, name of company representative and contact details. The financial information is based on book rather than on tax return.
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In constructing the dataset, we omit subsidiaries deemed to be inactive at the time of the survey and those with missing information on variables used in the analyses. Parent companies are not included for reasons to be discussed below. Some observations are reported twice in the same year, because some subgroups of larger groups are surveyed separately. We removed overlapping observations from the larger group and retained the subgroups. Overall, the main data contain 33,340 observations; summary statistics are presented in Table 2 .
26 A consolidated subsidiary is a company controlled by a parent through 50% or more of the voting rights, under the disclosure requirement for financial reporting prior to the 2000 reform. An affiliate company is a company controlled by a parent through 20% or more of the voting rights.
27 Westney (1998) and Onji (2009) provide further descriptions of the ACD. 28 The discrepancies between these two notions of corporate income arise from, among other things, the differences in the definitions of costs and in the treatment of timing. In U.S. data, Desai (2005) reports that book and tax income diverge considerably but the breakdown in the relationship does not happen until the mid-1990s. If the technology for accounting manipulation developed concurrently in Japan, then the two notions of corporate income should be reasonably close since the sample year is before the mid-1990s. Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. "F&I" refers to financial and insurance. ZEROPROFIT is the indicator for reported profit in the range of (−1, 1). SAME ADDRESS and SAMEREP are the indicators for subsidiaries that share the same address and company representative with another member company, respectively. We exclude observations in the 1% tails of the profitability distributions to compute the profitability measures used in the analysis.
The profitability distribution 4.1 A preliminary comparison
We first consider the shape of the profitability distribution. If incomes were relocated, the distribution would become "narrower" than the true distribution. A natural comparison group would be a sample of stand-alone entities, but such data are not available for the current study. As a practical alternative, Figure 2 : The profitability distribution by the level of ownership (based on the kernel density estimate using the optimal bandwidth).
we compare wholly owned and partially owned subsidiaries. To the extent that the shifting of income mainly takes place between subsidiaries with common ownership, we would expect a lower variance in profitability for a group of wholly owned subsidiaries. The left panel in Figure 2 presents a visual comparison of the distributions of profitability, defined here as after-tax profit per sales, for wholly owned subsidiaries and partially owned group members.
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The profitability distribution of the wholly owned subsidiaries (solid line) has more mass around zero profit. In the right panel, the solid line presents the difference between the two distributions and highlights the concentration of wholly owned subsidiaries near the low level of profitability. The negative difference for the high levels of profitability indicates a higher profitability for the partially owned sub-29 The kernel density estimation uses the bandwidth determined by the optimal bandwidth formula. The data used in this section exclude observations in the 1% tails of the profitability distributions.
sidiaries. For those with positive income, the distribution for wholly owned subsidiaries appears relatively concentrated.
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The distribution for the wholly owned subsidiaries is also relatively dense on negative profits, suggesting that the survival rates between the groups might differ.
Is the difference due to heterogeneity in business activity?
Heterogeneity in business activities may be responsible for the observed difference in profitability distribution. For example, the age distribution for the wholly owned subsidiaries is skewed strongly to the left. To account for this heterogeneity, we apply the semiparametric density decomposition technique developed by DiNardo et al. (1996) , which has been used to compare, for instance, the wage distributions of migrant workers with workers who stayed behind in Mexico (Chiquiar and Hanson 2005) . The technique is often compared to the Oaxaca decomposition.
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We follow the application by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) and control for the differences in observed attributes including age, paid-in capital, sales, number of workers, 2-digit industry, region, parent's industry, and sample year. To the extent that the business risks are not captured by these variables, however, the residual component can reflect differences in business risk as well as the behavioral response.
The dashed line on the right panel in Figure 2 shows the difference in the distribution after adjusting for the differences in the observables. The smaller magnitude of the dashed line as compared to the solid line indicates that a part of the observed difference in distributions is explained by the differences in the observables. The difference still remains after the adjustment, however, suggesting that the tax incentive has an influence. As a first approximation of the revenue loss based on the comparison of wholly and partially owned subsidiaries, our "back-of-the-envelope" calculation suggests that about 2.1% of income is shifted out from wholly owned subsidiaries.
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This would be a 30 The plots by sample year show a similar pattern, except that the difference between the two groups is widest for the 1988 sample. This suggests the impacts of stronger incentives prior to the 1990 tax reform, but the difference in the economic climates might be a confounding influence.
31 With the Oaxaca decomposition, a male-female wage gap, for example, is decomposed into explained and unexplained components. Likewise, with the DiNardo et al. (1996) technique, the density function at each point of support is decomposed into a component explained by the differences in observables and a residual component. Onji (2009) applies the DiNardo et al. (1996) decomposition to sales distributions.
32 This computation takes the adjusted profitability distribution of partially owned subsidiaries as the "true" distribution. The smaller mass for a high profitability range in the conservative estimate since we assume partially owned subsidiaries do not shift income in this calculation. Caution is needed in interpreting the figure, but the magnitude suggests income shifting may be a pervasive behavior that deserves further investigation. As a measure of profitability, we believe profit per sales is the most sensible variable available in our dataset. To see the sensitivity of this choice, we have tried different measures; profit per worker and profit per paid-in capital (PCAP). See distribution of wholly owned subsidiaries is due to income shifting. The cutoff point for this high profitability range is the profitability of 0.7 percentage points. Under this assumption, the number of wholly owned subsidiaries that would have shifted income is 557.6, or 3.3% of wholly owned subsidiaries in the sample. This 3.3% is obtained by integrating the adjusted difference over the range and computing its share in the distribution of partially owned subsidiaries. We further assume that (1) income shifting reduces profitability by 0.8 percentage points and (2) the amount of sales is 3664 million yen (the average amount of sales of wholly owned subsidiaries in the range). The value 90.8 is based on the difference in profitability between the points of the largest increase and decrease of the adjusted difference in Figure  2 . This implies that on average 25.7 million yen is shifted out from 557.6 corporations.
The raw difference, as shown by the solid line in each panel, indicates that the distribution for wholly owned subsidiaries is more dense around zero. For profit per worker on the left panel, the adjusted difference is much less pronounced. To assess the statistical significance, we considered the variance of the distribution. Table 3 presents the results of the F-test for the homogeneity of variance: Column 1 compares the unadjusted variances; Column 2 compares the unadjusted distribution for wholly owned subsidiaries with the adjusted distribution for partially owned subsidiaries (as in Figures 2 and 3) ; Column 3 tries an alternative adjustment method to check sensitivity. The tests use the variance of the empirical distributions estimated with the kernel density, and the means and standard deviations are shown in Table 3 . Consider first the variance of unadjusted distributions (Column 1). For sales or workers as the denominator, the variance of profitability is significantly higher for the group of partially owned subsidiaries. The variance of profit per paid-in capital is not statistically different between groups. The difference is significant after the adjustment for each profitability measure under either adjustment method (Columns 2 and 3) . Overall, the visual inspection and the F-test indicate that the spread of the profitability distribution is narrower for the tightly controlled subsidiaries, suggesting the relocation of income due to income shifting.
Is the pattern due to vertical shifting?
The preceding analysis presumes that income is shifted horizontally among subsidiaries and excludes parent companies. We believe that the focus on the subsidiary sample is sensible for two reasons: to maintain the comparability of the two subsamples and to maintain a uniform degree of auditing. First, parent companies are mostly listed on the stock exchanges, which have listing requirements on profitability. Subsidiaries are much smaller companies and are not traded on the stock exchanges except in a few cases. The comparison is made difficult by including larger parents in the group of wholly owned subsidiaries. Second, the National Tax Agency audits larger corporations more frequently than smaller corporations. Thus, income shifting is likely to be more pervasive in the subsidiary sample.
The concentrated profitability distribution of wholly owned subsidiaries is, however, similar to that documented in studies on transfer pricing (Grubert et al. 1993) .
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In these studies, the concentrated profitability of the subsidiaries of foreign multinationals in the USA is attributed to income being shifted away from U.S. soil. In our sample, parent companies are profitable, exhibiting a profitability distribution relatively skewed to the right. An alternative interpretation of our finding on the concentrated distribution is that the income is shifted into parent companies, perhaps to compensate management/employees at parent corporations or to meet the listing requirement for the stock exchange. In this interpretation, the pattern does not suggest the prevalence of tunneling (Bertrand et al. 2002; Morck et al. 2005) , a behavior where a majority owner siphons profits from a company to the disadvantage of minority owners. If profits were siphoned from partially owned subsidiaries, the partially owned subsample should exhibit a left-skewed distribution.
It is difficult to distinguish between hypotheses from the profitability distribution alone. It may be possible to amalgamate the sample of wholly owned companies with the sample of parent companies. However, this would compromise the comparability of the subsamples, since the control group contains smaller corporations and the parents are oversampled.
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Below, we turn to a subsample that would not be affected by the siphoning consideration: a sample of loss-making subsidiaries.
5 The attrition of loss-making subsidiaries
Duration model with censored data
We next consider the attrition rate of loss-making subsidiaries. If corporate groups utilize tax credits on losses made by subsidiaries, we should observe a higher survival rate among the group of loss-making subsidiaries to which income is shifted.
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To operationalize the test, we once again compare the group members with varying degrees of control, measured by the level of intragroup shareholding. To the extent that high shareholding levels are associated with ease of income shifting, we should observe a negative correlation between the likelihood of exit and the shareholding level.
We observe the survival of each company over four years with the data constructed from the three surveys by matching companies across years. In matching companies across surveys, while the data contain a unique subsidiary identifier for each company within each group according to the data specification, we used the founding year and month as an extra identifier. This precautionary measure was to ensure accuracy, but it led to omissions of authentic matches with minor inconsistencies in the reported founding dates. Attrition is measured by the absence of a company in the subsequent surveys, so that the changes may be due to closure, to being merged within or outside the group, and to the shares being sold outside the group. The sample is restricted to those that reported zero or less profit in the 1988 survey and to those with valid information on variables used in the analysis.
In the standard duration analysis, the time to failure is observed (Greene 2000) . Here, we have censored data, as we only observe whether a company has exited by the survey date. To account for the nature of the data, we fit an interval-censored proportional hazard model (ICPHM). A hazard model posits the length of survival as a function of time and covariates. A proportional hazard model is a semiparametric class of the model with a function, common across individuals, determining the effect of survival time, h(t, x, β) = h 0 (t)e xβ (Cox 1972) . In this expression, t is the survival length and is censored in our application; x is a vector of covariates for which β is the parameter and h 0 (t) characterizes how the hazard function, h(.), changes as a function of survival length. The parameters of the function are estimated from the data. 35 The tax law on mergers reinforces the prediction. As mentioned already, the losses carried forward by an acquiring corporation are still carried forward after a merger, but those of an acquired corporation are not. This rule creates tax incentives to merge a profitable corporation into a loss-making corporation.
Results
The ICPHM is estimated with the maximum likelihood following the application in Hosmer and Lemeshow (1999) . Since the effects of ownership appeared to be nonlinear, we present the specification with dummies for the different levels of holding, the base being the category of less than 50% ownership (Table  4) . The dependent variable is 1 for companies that have exited by the time of the subsequent survey and is 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses. The sample in Column 1 is the subsidiaries reporting losses in 1988. The sample in Column 2 is restricted to observations belonging to groups with (1) more than one valid observations and (2) mixed survival outcomes. The estimation is based on the expanded data set following the method outlined in Hosmer and Lemeshow (1999: 262) . All columns include dummies for headquarter location (aggregated over 6 regions), own industry and parent's industry (2 digit for Column 1 and 1 digit for Column 2). Group dummies are included in Column 2. The unit for AGE is decades. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; * * significant at 1%.
The level of ownership is the sum of voting stock held directly by the parent and indirectly by other members. The control variables are age, age squared, paid-in capital, initial loss size, own industry, parent's industry, and headquarter location. The outcome is the exit, so that a negative coefficient on a covariate implies a negative correlation with the exit likelihood. The coefficient on the dummy for wholly owned subsidiaries implies an odds ratio of 0.531 (= e −0.633 ), indicating that 100%-owned subsidiaries are exiting at a rate that is 46.9% lower than subsidiaries that are less-than-50%-owned. The 95% confidence interval for the odds ratio is [0.411, 0.686] . With the estimate of the baseline nonsurvivorship of 13.9% at the end of four years, the attrition rate is 6.5 percentage points lower for the wholly owned subsidiaries. The odds ratio is lower for the dummy for subsidiaries in the holding range of [75, 100) and is higher for that in the range [50, 75) . The coefficients on these dummies are highly significant, indicating that the survival rate is generally higher for tightly controlled subsidiaries. The initial size of the loss (in absolute value) significantly increases the chance of nonsurvivorship, as expected.
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To check whether the result is driven by the correlation between unobserved group heterogeneities and the survival rate, we have considered a specification that includes group dummies (Column 2). This entails trimming the sample to (1) groups with at least two members, and (2) companies with a group-level survival rate between 0 and 1. The trimming halved the sample. The coefficients on the top two ownership dummies are robust, while the dummy for the ownership range of [50, 75) turns insignificant. Thus, unobserved group heterogeneity is not the cause of the differential survival rates across ownership. In sum, the analysis indicates that the tightly owned subsidiaries are more likely to survive after reporting a negative profit.
We interpret the analyses of the spread of distribution and the survival rate as being consistent with the tax consideration. One hypothesis that competes with our tax-based explanation is that many of the partially owned corporations are joint ventures in new lines of business. Being at a trial stage of business, they may be closed quickly once the operation turned unsuccessful. While we cannot reject the alternative explanation of differences in business operation, we have controlled in our analyses for each company's own industry as well as for its parent's industry.
6 The share of firms that report zero profit
Empirical approach
In the model that accounts for the differential tax treatment of small and large corporations, the solution functions depend on corporate sizes; the optimal shifting is capped at zero profit for large corporations but not for small corporations. To see if the differential tax treatment affects profit reporting, Figure 4 presents histograms of profits around zero by size of corporation.
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Figure 4: The distribution of profits by paid-in capital.
Notes: The sample used for this figure is based on the subsidiary data from FY1988, 1990 FY1988, , and 1992 . It contains active corporations with valid entries for profit over the range of [−20, 60] . Profit is after-tax book profit and is in million yen. The width of each bin is 1 million except for the bin spanning 0, which has the range of (−1, 1). This is because the information in the data rounds to zero any figures with absolute value below one million. Small corporations are the observations with paid-in capital (k) at 100 million yen or less. Large corporations are those with k above 100 million yen.
The sample only includes active corporations. The left-hand side is for corporations at and below 100 million yen in paid-in capital-a group with no unambiguous incentive to restrict shifting to zero profit. The profit distribution 37 It might appear that the effect of the tax threshold is better analyzed by the regression discontinuity design. We have reservations about using that design in this setting: Corporations just above the threshold foregoing the preferential tax treatments must have some business reasons that we cannot observe in our dataset.
is half-pyramid shaped; the highest fraction of samples occurs in the zero-profit bin, with progressively declining fractions on the right and with a sharp decline on the left. The right-hand panel is for large corporations. The distribution is much flatter with an apparent clustering at zero-a pattern that is not explained by the risk-sharing hypothesis but is in line with tax incentives.
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To check whether size matters for the probability that a firm reports zero profit, we fit a probit model to account for the differences in company characteristics.
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The dependent variable is the indicator for subsidiary i reporting zero profit, which is defined as accounting profit in the range (-1 million yen, 1 million yen).
40
We regress it on LARGE i , a dummy for paid-in capital of i larger than 100 million yen. The coefficient on this variable captures the difference in the fraction of large corporations reporting zero profit as compared to a group of small corporations. Controlling for observables, the sign on LARGE i is expected to be positive under the income-shifting hypothesis. We also include HOLDING i , a proxy for shifting costs (ψ) in the theoretical model, which is defined as the percentage of voting stock held within a group.
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Once again, we would expect that tight control would facilitate financial arrangements to shift income and to share the benefit of tax savings. One concern is that some of the industry variations in the level of holding may not be solely due to the extent of control; by law, financial institutions are prohibited from holding more than a 5% stake in other companies in principle, with some allowance for specific sets of activities.
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In most industries, the mean 38 We observe no apparent clustering on the after-tax profit equivalent to 8 million yen in before-tax income. This might be due to the presence of another kink point at 4 million yen.
39 This approach bundles corporations that report positive and negative profits in the same category. Excluding those with negative profits (4.5% of the main sample) did not qualitatively affect the baseline result. 40 We have considered the possibility of the tax income being systematically lower than the accounting profits by adjusting the range of profit defined as zero profit. The results are not sensitive to this change. The working paper version of this paper presents the results along with other extensions and robustness checks omitted here for brevity. 41 We have tried two binary specifications, one with a dummy for wholly owned subsidiaries and another with a dummy for subsidiaries with more than 75% of ownership. The results were not qualitatively different.
42 Prior to the reforms of 1997, Article 11 of the Antitrust Regulation restricted banks from holding more than a 5% stake in other companies in principle. The upper limit for insurance corporations was 10%. However, upon approval, banks and insurance corporations may hold wholly owned subsidiaries, generally in activities integrated with the parents' operations, such as ATM machine maintenance, personnel service, maintenance of branch buildings, and bank logistics. Many subsidiaries that conduct periphery activities, such as leasing, investment advising, and credit-card operation, have holding levels as high as the law allows.
holding level is around 70%; for financial and insurance parents, the mean is 45% and the standard deviation is high. We consider the finance and insurance industry separately.
In principle, the true amount of loss is not observable, so that the relative size (|y 2 |/y) is also not observable. RELATIVESIZE i is a proxy for this variable and is defined as the percentage of total group sales accounted for by subsidiary i. We would expect it is less likely for subsidiaries that are large relative to other group members to report zero profit. The model suggests that tax rates affect tax incentives, but since we include year dummies to control for the differences in the business climate, the effects of tax-rate differentials are not identifiable. Control variables include age of the company in months, natural logarithm of paid-in capital, a dummy for public company, industry dummies, eight geographic region dummies, and time dummies. Parent's industry dummies are also included for the regression except on the financial and insurance industry subsample.
Results
The marginal effects estimated with the baseline probit model are presented in Columns 1 through 3 in Table 5 for the sample that pools all sectors.
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Without controlling for corporate size in the regression, the coefficient on LARGE is negative as shown in Column 1.
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This is as expected: Corporations are not likely to expand unless they are successful. A control variable for the size-the natural log of paid-in capital (PCAP )-turns the coefficient to positive and significant (Column 2) and the pattern is consistent with the income-shifting hypothesis. The signs of the coefficients on HOLDING and RELATIVESIZE are consistent with the income-shifting hypothesis and are significant. The pattern is robust to inclusion of a host of control variables including time dummies, the dummy for publicly listed corporations, own-industry dummies, parent's industry dummies, and region dummies (Column 3). The positive coefficient on the 1992 dummy reflects the onset of the recession after the collapse of the bubble economy. The significantly negative coefficient on the public corporation dummy reflects the stringent criteria for being listed on the stock exchange, but it may in part capture the disincentive to artificially reduce profits out of the concern about market valuation.
Columns 4-5 examine the financial and insurance parents separately.
43 The result from a logit model is qualitatively the same. 44 We have tried a specification that includes the number of workers and the amount of sales as additional controls for size. The point estimates on LARGE were generally lower but were still significant. The dependent variable is 1 if the reported profit is zero and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 3-5 include dummies for own industry and headquarter location and a constant. PUBLIC is omitted in the non-F&I subsample; all public corporations reported nonzero profits. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; * * significant at 1%.
The coefficient on LARGE in finance and insurance is three times as large as in the other sectors. This seems to suggest that the restriction on mergers renders income-shifting attractive in the sector. The industry differences in profitability alone would not explain this finding since the likelihood of zeroprofit reporting is relative to another group of firms in the same sector.
Notably for the other sectors (Column 4), the coefficient on HOLDING is negative and significant-a pattern that appears to be inconsistent with income shifting. The result is robust to nonlinear specification of HOLDING, where we replace the variable with quartile dummies and find a high incidence of zero profit in the range between 25 and 50% ownership. Other categories are not significantly different from each other or the base. One concern in interpre-tation is the possible endogeneity caused by window dressing. The accounting rule requires a broader disclosure on subsidiaries with 50% or more ownership, creating incentives for parents to enhance the appearance of consolidated financial statements by artificially keeping the stock holding of members below the statutory limit. Thus, this pattern can arise when income is shifted while the holding level is kept artificially low. The standard solution for such a measurement issue in a linear regression is instrumental variable estimation, but our model is nonlinear, and we cannot apply the solution even if valid instruments are available (Hausman 2001) .
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The financial and insurance sector is not likely to be affected by this concern, since the 5% rule puts exogenous restrictions on the level of intragroup shareholding. The coefficient on HOLDING for the financial and insurance sector is positive and significant, supporting the conjecture that the degree of control reduces the cost of shifting. Comparing Columns 4 and 5, the estimates on other variables are broadly consistent. Overall, the results of the probit analyses are largely consistent with the income-shifting hypothesis.
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45 In the absence of a clearly established solution, we have considered additional variables conjectured to capture shifting costs: SAMEADD i is the indicator for the subsidiary that shares an address with another group member, and SAMEREP i is the indicator for the company representative of the subsidiary i also being the head of some other group company. SAMEREP i has a significant correlation with the outcome in the subsample of other than finance and insurance except when log sales and log workers are included. 46 The tax incentive to shift income arises only when some group members are making losses while others are profiting. We have tried excluding observations from profitable groups. A group is defined to be profitable if x% of group members report a positive profit. However, one needs to be cautious about mechanical bias; if the fraction of large corporations in excluded observations is greater, the coefficient on LARGE from the remaining sample mechanically increases since excluded large corporations would mostly be reporting nonzero profit. In a sensible subsample, the coefficient on LARGE increases by 0.008.
47 Another explanation involves the accounting gimmickry involving so-called hidden assets. Hidden assets arise from the discrepancy between the value of assets in the balance sheet, which is recorded in book value, and their value in the market. In a well-known strategy, a corporation offsets operation losses with profit realized on hidden assets: a corporation sells an asset, realizes its hidden value while offsetting operation loss, and repurchases it immediately. Such a financial operation allows firms to windowdress financial statements and to realize capital gains without invoking tax liability. For this scenario to explain the differences in the profit reporting behavior by corporate size, the propensity to engage in such activities must be greater for large corporations.
Concluding remarks
This paper considered perverse incentives generated by tax-law asymmetries in a corporate income tax that lacks an explicit allowance for loss offsets among group members. We argued that, to the extent that corporate groups are formed for business purposes, income shifting within corporate groups is an unintended consequence of government's failure to account for the group behavior in the tax law. As a whole, the findings suggest income shifting was pervasive among large Japanese capital keiretsu around the early 1990s.
Our findings underscore the importance of accounting for group behavior in corporate taxation. The CITs of most nations do not allow for consolidated filing of taxes, in spite of the emerging standard for consolidated financial reporting around the world; it seems reasonable to suspect that income shifting is pervasive among corporate groups in such nations. In this view, the introduction of consolidated filing in 2002 is a step forward for Japan's tax system. Yet, the nation's tax system contains various inconsistencies in how groups of corporations are treated. For example, the special depreciation deduction for small companies provides protections against subsidiaries of large corporations benefiting from the scheme (National Tax Agency 2007). No restriction, however, is placed on the same subsidiaries from paying taxes at the reduced rate intended for small stand-alone corporations. Our paper calls for further amendments to the tax system to reflect business practices.
Finally, we interpreted the evidence as being driven by tax motives, but one may argue that other motives for within-group transfers, particularly risk sharing (Nakatani 1984; Hoshi and Kashyap 2001; Khanna and Yafeh 2005) , are the driving force behind the pattern, with perhaps the tax incentive playing a minor role. We view this paper as an early step in understanding the relevance of tax motives to within-group transfers. It would be interesting to see if an introduction of a group tax in Japan or elsewhere changed the behavior of corporate groups. 2 (s) > m, so that the marginal tax rate faced by Company 2 is τ H . Since Company 1 also faces τ H when they are profitable, no tax savings arise from an additional s in this range. Thus, to save on transaction costs, the firm will not shift more than |y 2 | + m.
Appendix: Derivation of the solution functions
Second, consider the range s ∈ [0, |y 2 |]. In this range, Company 2 reports income of zero or below, since the amount of shifting is no greater than the amount of loss, so that the relevant marginal tax rate for Company 2 is 0. The relevant marginal tax rate faced by Company 1 is τ H or else this contradicts the optimization behavior. Specifically, the after-tax income of Company 1 can be positive or negative; in the absence of transaction costs, condition (1) guarantees that Company 1 reports positive income, but depending on the costs of shifting, Company 1 can report negative income. However, suppose that there exists a value for s ∈ [0, |y 2 
s.t. y 2 + s 0.
The inequality constraint on a parent's profit is not included here, but it can be verified that the constraint holds with a slack. The first-order conditions for the problem are
λ(y 2 + s) = 0, λ ≥ 0.
The solution for this restricted problem is summarized as 
The solution to the problem is summarized as
By combining (13) and (19), we obtain s * = min max min |y 2 |,
